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Abstract
Computing privacy parameters for the differentially private stochastic gradient descent method (DP-SGD) is equivalent toanalysing one dimensional mechanisms. We propose a numerical accountant for evaluating the (ε, δ)-privacy loss for mech-anisms with continuous one dimensional output. The proposed method is based on a numerical approximation of an integralformula which gives the tight (ε, δ)-values. The approximation is carried out by discretising the integral and by evaluating theresulting discrete convolutions using the fast Fourier transform algorithm. We focus on the subsampled Gaussian mechanismwhich underlies DP-SGD. We give both theoretical error bounds and numerical error estimates for the approximation. Experimen-tal comparisons with state-of-the-art techniques demonstrate significant improvements in bound tightness and/or computationtime. Python code for the method can be found in Github (https://github.com/DPBayes/PLD-Accountant/).
Background
Neighbouring relation of datasets
We use the following notation. An input dataset containing
N data points is denoted as X = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ XN , where
xi ∈ X , 1 ≤ i ≤ N.Two datasets X and Y are neighbours in remove/add rela-tion if you get one by removing/adding an element from/tothe other and denote it with∼R. We say X and Y are neigh-bours in substitute relation if you get one by substitutingone element in the other and denote this with ∼S.
Differential privacy
Let ε > 0 and δ ∈ [0,1]. Let ∼ define a neighbouring rela-tion. MechanismM : XN → R is (ε, δ,∼)-DP if for every
X ∼ Yand every measurable set E ⊂ R it holds that
Pr(M(X ) ∈ E) ≤ eεPr(M(Y ) ∈ E) + δ.
We callM tightly (ε, δ,∼)-DP, if there does not exist δ′ < δsuch thatM is (ε, δ′,∼)-DP.
Privacy Loss Function
LetM : XN → R be a randomised mechanism and let
X ∼ Y . Let fX(t) denote the density function ofM(X ) and
fY (t) that ofM(Y ). Assume fX(t) > 0 and fY (t) > 0 for all
t ∈ R. We define the privacy loss function of fX over fY as
LX/Y (t) = log fX(t)fY (t).Privacy Loss Distribution
Suppose LX/Y : R → D, D ⊂ R is a continuously dif-ferentiable bijective function. The privacy loss distribution(PLD) ofM(X ) overM(Y ) is defined to be a random vari-able which has the density function
ωX/Y (s) =
fX
(L−1X/Y (s)) dL−1X/Y (s)ds , s ∈ LX/Y (R),
0, else.
(1)
We get the tight privacy guarantee for compositions from acontinuous counterpart of Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 in [3].
Theorem
Consider k consecutive applications of a mechanism M. Let
ε > 0. The composition is tightly (ε, δ)-DP for δ given by δ(ε) =
max{δX/Y (ε), δY/X (ε)}, where
δX/Y (ε) =
∫ ∞
ε
(1− eε−s)
(
ωX/Y ∗k ωX/Y
)
(s) ds, (2)
where ωX/Y ∗k ωX/Y denotes the k -fold convolution of ωX/Y (a sim-ilar formula holds for δY/X (ε)).
Poisson subsampling with ∼R-relation
The (ε, δ,∼R)-DP analysis of the Poisson subsampling isequivalent to considering the distributions
fX(t) = q 1√2piσ2e
−(t−1)2
2σ2 + (1− q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2,
fY (t) = 1√2piσ2e
−t2
2σ2.
Here σ2 denotes the variance of the additive Gaussiannoise, and q the subsampling ratio.
The privacy loss function is given by
LX/Y (t) = log
q 1√
2piσ2
e
−(t−1)2
2σ2 +(1−q) 1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2
1√
2piσ2
e
−t2
2σ2
= log
(
q e
2t−1
2σ2 + (1− q)
)
.
LX/Y (R) = (log(1− q),∞) and LX/Y is a strictlyincreasing continuously differentiable bijective function.
Straightforward calculation shows that
L−1X/Y (s) = σ2 log
es − (1− q)
q
+
1
2
.
Moreover,
d
d s
L−1X/Y (s) =
σ2es
es − (1− q).
The privacy loss distribution ωX/Y is then given by (1).In the paper [1] we also analyse sampling withoutreplacement and sampling with replacement in
∼S-neighbouring relation.
Algorithm
Derivation of the algorithm:
I Approximate the convolutions as
(ω ∗ ω)(x) ≈
∫ L
−L
ω(t)ω(x − t) dt =: (ω ~ ω)(x).
I Further approximate∫ L
−L
ω(t)ω(x − t) dt ≈
∫ L
−L
ω˜(t)ω˜(x − t) dt , (3)
where ω˜ is a 2L-periodic extension of ω such that
ω˜(t + n2L) = ω(t) for all t ∈ [−L,L) and n ∈ Z.
I Divide the interval [−L,L] on n points x0, . . . , xn−1,
xi = −L + i∆x , where ∆x = 2L/n.
I Truncate the integral representation (2) at L andapproximate using a Riemann sum over the points xi.
Fourier Accountant algorithm
Input: PLD ω, number of compositions k , truncation param-eter L, number of discretisation points n.
1. Evaluate the discrete distribution values
ωi = ω(−L + i∆x), i = 0, . . . ,n − 1, ∆x = 2Ln .
2. Set
ω =
[
ω0 . . . ωn−1
]T
.
3. Evaluate the discrete convolutions:
Ck = (∆x)−1
[
DF−1(F(Dω∆x)k)] ,
whereD = [ 0 In/2In/2 0 ] andF is the discrete Fourier transform.
4. Evaluate the integral approximation:
δ(ε) ≈ ∆x
∑n−1
`=`ε
(
1− eε−(−L+`∆x))Ck` ,
`ε = min{` ∈ Z : −L + `∆x > ε}.
Tail bound estimate
The effect of the truncation parameter L can bebounded using the Chernoff bound.
Define (see also [2])
α(λ) := log E
t∼fX (t)
[eλL(t)].
By the change of variable s = L(t) we have
E[eλω] =
∫ ∞
−∞
eλsω(s) ds
=
∫ ∞
−∞
eλL(t)fX(t) dt = eα(λ).
Using existing bounds for α(λ) [2], we can bound E[eλω].
Suppose the conditions of Lemma 3 of [2] hold for
λ = L/2. Neglecting the O(q3λ3/σ3)-term, the Chernoffbound gives the approximative upper bound∫ ∞
L
(ω ∗k ω)(s)ds / exp
(
k
q2(L2 + 1)
L
2
(1− q)σ2
)
e−
L2
2 . (4)
Estimate for the discretisation error
Consider the Riemann sum
In := ∆x
∑n−1
`=`ε
(
1− eε−(−L+`∆x))Ck` .
and denote En the error term arising from thediscretisation with n points (details in [1]). We show that
En = K∆x + O((∆x)2) = K
2L
n
+ O
((2L
n
)2)
for some constant K independent of n. Therefore,
2(In − I2n) = En + O((∆x)2)
which leads us to use as an estimate
err(L,n) := 2 |In − I2n| . (5)
Experiments
Numerical convergence and the errors (4) and (5),when k = 103, q = 0.01, σ = 1.5 and ε = 1.0 :
L FA error (4)
1.5 2.70415916E-06 3.444 ·10−1
2.0 2.70605608E-06 1.480 ·10−1
4.0 2.70605611E-06 4.392 ·10−4
6.0 2.70605611E-06 2.610 ·10−8
8.0 2.70605609E-06 3.108 ·10−14
Table: Convergence of the δ(ε)-approximation with respect to L (when
n = 8 · 105) and the error estimate (4). The estimate err(L,n) = O(10−13).
n FA error (5)
2.5 · 104 2.74466676 ·10−6 3.416·10−2
5 · 104 2.70479697 ·10−6 1.096 ·10−3
1 · 105 2.70605201 ·10−6 1.528·10−6
2 · 105 2.70605554 ·10−6 3.446 ·10−9
4 · 105 2.70605601 ·10−6 2.132 ·10−11
Table: Convergence of δ(ε)-approximation with respect to n (when L = 10.0)and the estimate (5). The tail bound estimate (4) is O(10−22).
Comparison to the moments accountant [2]:
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